

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 25, 2016

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

The Honorable James Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Secretary Kerry, Secretary Carter, and Director Clapper:

On March 23, Pakistan held its annual Pakistan Day military parade and revealed its new 2,750km range Shaheen III medium-range nuclear ballistic missile (MRBM) that was carried on a 16-wheel transporter erector launcher (TEL). Mr. Richard Fisher, a leading specialist in Chinese military technology, wrote to us in the attached letter noting the design similarities between the Shaheen III TEL, the Sanjiang Special Vehicle Corporation of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) WS51200 TEL, and a Chinese provided TEL North Korea's new KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This led him to conclude, "CASIC has again enabled a Pakistani nuclear missile capability."

We are deeply concerned that the TEL displayed in Pakistan was acquired from China. The transfer of an item as advanced and significant as a TEL, even if only transferred as a truck chassis known to be capable of modification to a TEL, would require the approval from the highest levels of China's government if not also the People's Liberation Army. Such cooperation between the governments of Pakistan and China would represent a threat to the national security of the United States and its allies. Based on this threat, we ask for your prompt reply to the following questions:

1. Is there any evidence that China or Chinese entities have supplied TELs, or trucks capable of being modified to TELs, for a Pakistani medium-range nuclear ballistic missile? If so, how many? And when did the Administration learn of the possibility that such TELs would be transferred to Pakistan? And of the transfer(s)?
2. What, if anything, has the Administration done to ensure China halts such cooperation and demands the return of these TELs?
3. What entities in Pakistan and in China were conduits for the transfer of funding involved in this transfer?

4. Is there any other evidence of Chinese entity support for Pakistan's ballistic missile program or nuclear weapons program, whether technology transfer or otherwise?
5. Would such cooperation be in violation of any United Nations Security Council resolutions or any U.S. sanction laws? If so, will the Administration levy any sanctions against China for this apparent support for the Pakistani ballistic missile program?
6. How does the presence of Pakistani road-mobile MRBMs with possible nuclear warheads change U.S., Israel and other allies' security posture? What are the impacts for U.S. and allied (again, including Israeli) missile defenses?

Where proliferation occurs that threatens the national security of the United States and its allies, it must be countered quickly and forcefully. We look forward to receiving your response to these critical questions.

Sincerely,



Mike Rogers
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces



Ted Poe
Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade

ENCLOSURE